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DESIGNATIONS OF CRITICAL HABITAT
PURSUANT TO THE ENDANGERED SPECIES
ACT: DOES NEPA APPLY?
David G. Perillo*
INTRODUCTION
H uman beings have a disproportionate impact on the extinction
rate of other species.' Habitat modification and destruction are
the primary cause of such extinction.' Although man has acted
unwittingly, the effects are "just as irrevocabl[e], as if he had hunt-
ed them down to the last individual."3 As of June 1992, twelve
hundred and forty five animal and plant species were listed as
threatened or endangered in the United States.4 Even more alarm-
ing, aproximately one species is lost forever through extinction each
day, and this number is expected to increase to one hundred species
per day by the end of the decade.'
One positive effect of man's disregard for the environment is the
enlightenment that has come with it. Mankind now realizes that it
benefits in many ways from the existence of diverse species. They
supply mankind with food sources, industrial inputs, medicinal
sources, pollution indicators, and aesthetic resources.6
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University School of Law.
1. John C. Kunich, The Fallacy of Deathbed Conservation under the Endan-
gered Species Act, 24 ENVTL. L. 501, 503 (1994).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. 139 CONG. REc. E1018 (daily ed. Apr. 23, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Studds).
5. Nancy K. Kubasek & M. Neil Browne, The Endangered Species Act: An
Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 3 DICK. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1994).
6. Edwin M. Smith, The Endangered Species Act and Biological Conserva-
tion, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 361, 374-76 (1984).
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This realization has led to increased arguments for the preserva-
tion of the environment.7 An ethics-based argument for preserving
wildlife is that humans have a moral duty to protect future genera-
tions as well as to conserve biological diversity.8 Other commenta-
tors argue that because humans are only part of a larger biological
community, it is wrong to jeopardize the continued existence of
species.9 One final argument is that it is immoral to inflict pain on
living creatures."
These ethical arguments have resulted in legislation in the United
States to help preserve the environment. The National Environmen-
tal Policy Act" ("NEPA") and the Endangered Species Act 2
("ESA") are two examples of environmental legislation enacted in
response to increased public awareness and concern for the environ-
ment. 3 Because of ambiguities in these statutes, however, there
exists disagreement in the federal appellate courts as to how NEPA
and ESA work in conjunction with one another. 4
This Note analyzes NEPA and ESA, including pertinent legisla-
tive history, then looks to disparate circuit court interpretations for
determining the necessity of NEPA compliance for a federal action
pursuant to ESA. Part I briefly reviews NEPA's purpose and regu-
lations. Part II discusses ESA, its focus, and procedures for listing
endangered or threatened species, and designation of critical habitat
to protect such species. Part III surveys the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits' analyses in their evaluating whether NEPA must be com-
plied with in designating critical habitat under ESA. Part IV argues
7. See Kunich, supra note 2, at 504 ("The notion that people should refrain
from annihilating their fellow species gained prominence in the aftermath of well
publicized extinctions.").
8. Smith, supra note 7, at 376.
9. Id. at 378.
10. Id. at 376-77.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1994).
12. 16 U.S.C §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a); 16 U.S.C § 1531(a).
14. See infra parts IV.A.2, IV.B.2. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit held that
NEPA does not apply to critical habitat designations made pursuant to ESA.
Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116
S. Ct. 698 (1996). In contrast the Tenth Circuit held that NEPA does apply to
critical habitat designations made under ESA. Catron County Bd. of Comm'r v.
United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1439 (10th Cir. 1996).
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that NEPA requirements must be fulfilled when designating critical
habitat under ESA. Finally, this Note concludes that requiring prep-
aration of an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") pursuant to
NEPA furthers the goals of ESA by scrutinizing the full extent of
the impact of proposed federal actions, thus allowing a fully in-
formed decision regarding designation of critical habitat
I. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT
A. Purpose and Requirements
"NEPA was designed to promote human welfare by alerting gov-
ernmental actors to the effect of their proposed actions on the phys-
ical environment."' 5 Congress enacted NEPA to "reverse what
seems to be a clear and intensifying trend towards environmental
degradation."' 6 The explicit congressional purpose of NEPA is
four-fold: first, to encourage harmony between man and the envi-
ronment; second, to promote efforts to eliminate damage to the
environment while stimulating the health of man; third, to increase
understanding of natural resources; and fourth to establish a Coun-
cil on Environmental Quality ("CEQ"). 7
NEPA explicitly imposes several on federal agencies. 8 Federal
agencies must, to the fullest extent possible, administer their laws
in accordance with NEPA."9 NEPA requires that all federal agen-
cies prepare a detailed statement, known as an Environmental Im-
pact Statement ("EIS"), before engaging in "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment."2
15. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
772 (1983).
16. H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2751, 2753.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 4321. The CEQ studies environmental conditions and trends.
42 U.S.C. § 4344(5). The CEQ also promulgates regulations providing guidelines
for the procedural provisions of NEPA. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (1995).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
19. Id. In addition, "[a]ll agencies of the Federal Government shall review
their present statutory authority, administrative regulations, and current policies
and procedures ... and shall propose to the President ... measures as may be
necessary to bring their authority and policies into conformity with the intent,
purposes, and procedures set forth" pursuant to NEPA.
Id. § 4333.
20. Id. at § 4332(C); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1508.14 (1995). For proposed ac-
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The EIS must include the expected environmental impact of the
proposed action," unavoidable adverse effects, 2 alternatives to
the proposed action,23 the relationship between the short-term uses
and long-term productivity of the affected area, 4 and any irrevers-
ible and irretrievable commitments of resources.
Any significant new information concerning the project's envi-
ronmental impact that is learned subsequent to the preparation of
the EIS, the agency is required to evaluate the new information.26
If the agency concludes that the new information is "relevant to
environmental concerns and bear[s] on the proposed action or its
impacts," the agency must then prepare a Supplemental Environ-
mental Impact Statement ("SEIS").27 A SEIS is also required if the
tions with uncertain environmental effects, the federal agency must first prepare
an Environmental Assessment ("EA") to determine if the environmental impact is
significant enough to justify requiring the agency to file an EIS. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(E); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.9 (1995). What constitutes significant is not
always easily discernible. "Significantly" is defined as requiring consideration of
both the context of the action and the intensity of its impact. Id. § 1508.27. The
regulations issued by the CEQ define "major federal action" as actions whose
effects may be major and potentially subject to Federal control. Id. § 1508.18
Some other regulations also clarify when an EIS is required. See, e.g., id.
§ 1507.3(b)(2)(i)-(iii) (1995) (listing actions that almost always require an EIS);
40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (1995) (furnishing categorical exclusions to the requirement
of preparing an EIS).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
22. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(ii).
23. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(iii). Two decisions dominate the case law relative to the
scope of alternatives considered in an EIS. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power
Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), rev'd on
other grounds, 462 U.S. 87 (1983) (affirming the "rule of reason" approach and
explaining that discussion of alternatives should be bounded by a notion of feasi-
bility); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (requiring a more expansive discussion of alternatives, although adopt-
ing a "rule of reason" approach to limit discussion).
24. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(iv).
25. Id. § 4332(2)(C)(v).
26. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1995); see also Marsh v. Oregon Natural
Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 374 (1989).
27. 40 C.F.R. 1502.9(c)(1)(ii) (1995); Marsh, 490 U.S. at 374. Cf 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(C).
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agency "makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are
relevant to environmental concerns."28
Thus, the requirements under NEPA are procedural rather than
substantive.29 These procedural requirements promote rational de-
cision making by requiring federal agencies to consider the environ-
mental consequences of their acts." While merely procedural, the
drafting of an EIS ensures that environmental considerations are
included in federal agencies' decision-making processes.3 Addi-
tionally, the procedural requirement of an EIS provides information
to the public about the environmental impact of agency acts.32
B. Exceptions to NEPA
The procedural provisions of NEPA mandate strict compliance.33
28. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i) (1995). The SEIS requirement is not stated in
NEPA. However, the NEPA regulations promulgated by the CEQ mandate the
supplement. Id. § 1502.9(c)(ii) (1995). See also Marsh, 490 U.S. at 370-71.
29. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978), rev'd on other grounds 462 U.S. 87 (1983).
The court stated that "NEPA does set forth significant substantive goals for the
Nation, but its mandate to the agencies is essentially procedural." Id. See also
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28
(1980) (stating that since NEPA only requires consideration of environmental
consequences, the act is procedural in nature); Aberdeen & Rockfish R.R. Co. v.
Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 422 U.S. 289, 319 (1975)
("NEPA does create a discrete procedural obligation on Government agencies to
give written consideration of environmental issues in connection with certain
major federal actions").
30. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A).
31. Id.; Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 143 (1981)
(requiring preparation of an EIS ensures that environmental considerations are
injected into the federal agency's decision making process); Kleppe v. Sierra
Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) (stating that the EIS ensures agencies take
a "hard look" at the environmental consequences of their actions).
32. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
In fact, NEPA requires all federal agencies to make available "information useful
in restoring, maintaining and enhancing the quality of the environment." 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(G).
33. NEPA states that federal agencies must give full "consideration" to the
environmental impact as part of their decision making process. 42 U.S.C.
§ 4332(2)(B). In addition NEPA implicitly requires "consideration" in its sub-
stantive mandate. Id. § 4331. Thus, a purely mechanical compliance with the
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Two exceptions, however, exist. First, there is a statutory exception
that permits non-compliance with NEPA's requirements.34 This
exception applies when direct conflict arises between NEPA and
either a federal agency regulation or another statute.35 NEPA ex-
plicitly states that "[it] was not intended to repeal, by implication,
any other regulation."36 If such a conflict arises, then NEPA is
deemed "supplemental" and the conflicting statute is enforced.37 It
is important to note, however, that each agency is still required to
review its "present statutory authority, administrative regulations,
and current policies and procedures," and do whatever is necessary
to conform with the "intent, purpose and procedures" of NEPA.38
The second exception to NEPA is known as the "functional
equivalency exception."39 Under this exception, when two statutes
procedural requirements of § 4332(2)(C) and (D), mandating preparation of EISs,
would not satisfy NEPA because this would not amount to a good faith "consid-
eration" of the environment. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. At6mic
Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
942 (1972); Hanly v. Mitchell, 460 F.2d 640, 648 (2d Cir. 1972) (giving
"[pireservation of the 'integrity' of the new [a]ct," as a reason for adopting the
strict compliance interpretation). But see California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th
Cir. 1982). The Block court held that courts must use a standard of "reasonable-
ness" when reviewing an agency's compliance with NEPA. Id. at 761. The rea-
sonableness standard requires determining whether the EIS's content and form
foster informed decision-making and public participation. Id. But even this lesser
standard still requires the federal agency to prepare an EIS. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 4335.
35. Id. NEPA applies "unless the existing law applicable to such agency's
operations expressly prohibits or makes full compliance with one of the directives
impossible." H.R. CONG. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in
1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2767, 2770. For an example of direct conflict see Flint Ridge
Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776 (1976) (Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") was not required to prepare an EIS
before an interstate land disclosure statement since HUD required approval of the
statement within 30 days, and this requirement conflicted with NEPA's EIS re-
quirement).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4335; Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987) (quoting United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669 (1973)).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 4335.
38. Id. § 4333.
39. The functional equivalency exception is non-statutory. Courts have used
the functional equivalency exception to exempt certain federal agency action from
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serve the same function, the more specific statute governs. 40 For a
court to apply the functional equivalency exception, the more spe-
cific statute must provide adequate standards to ensure sufficient
consideration of all environmental issues.1 Courts have permitted
the functional equivalency exception to NEPA in cases involving
EPA actions under the Clean Air Act ("CAA"),42 the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), 43 the Federal Insecti-
NEPA's procedural requirements, when NEPA concerns are addressed through
other regulations. See infra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Basic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406 (1980).
41. See Alabama v. United States EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504-05 (11th Cir.
1990). Court holds that RCRA's substantive and procedural standards are intend-
ed to ensure that EPA fully considers, assisted by public comment, environmental
effects involved in allowing hazardous waste management facility. Id. at 505. See
also Environmental Defense Fund v. United States EPA, 489 F.2d 1247, 1256
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (excusing compliance with NEPA when registering pesticides
under FIFRA since the statutes are functionally equivalent because "all of the
five core NEPA issues were carefully considered"). However, in Environmental
Defense Fund, the court construed the functional equivalency exception narrowly.
Id. at 1257. Specifically the court stated that the exception is "a narrow exemp-
tion from the literal requirements for those actions which are undertaken pursuant
to sufficient safeguards so that the purpose and policies behind NEPA will neces-
sarily be fulfilled." Id.
42. Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 386-87 (D.C. Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (EPA did not have to prepare an EIS in
connection with promulgation of new standards for emissions from cement plants
pursuant to the CAA because the procedures of creating the new standards
amounted to a functional equivalent of the NEPA process); Getty Oil Co. v.
Ruckelshaus, 467 F.2d 349, 359 (3d Cir. 1972) (finding that the Clean Air Act
procedure should be implemented instead of NEPA); Warren County v. North
Carolina, 528 F. Supp. 276, 287 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (holding that plaintiff's claims
that "no statement comparable to that required under the Clean Air Act has been
filed by the EPA, nor was the single hearing at which citizen complaints were re-
ceived ... structured in such a way that the core NEPA issues were addressed,"
were without merit). The Warren County court stated that "the hearing adequately
afforded the public ... the opportunity to participate in the decision-making
process and that the EPA fully considered all matters brought to its attention
before making its final decision. This meets the test of functional equivalence."
Id.
43. Alabama v. United States EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (1lth Cir. 1990) (com-
pliance with requirements of RCRA in issuing a permit for hazardous waste dis-
posal excused the agency from also having to comply with NEPA).
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cide Fungicide and Rodenticide Act ("FIFRA"),4 and the Safe
Drinking Water Act ("SDWA").45
The initial goal of NEPA was to create conditions where man
and nature exist in harmony.' NEPA promotes this goal by requir-
ing that an EIS be prepared before any federal agency action is
begun that may significantly affect the quality of the environ-
ment." The statutory exception and the functional equivalency
exception may allow another statute to replace NEPA requirements
in some cases. Even in cases where the conflicting statute is en-
forced instead of NEPA, however, there is a presumption that the
statute does not conflict with the general goal of NEPA. 4
II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
A. Designations of Endangered and Threatened Species
The environmental movement of the 1960s gave rise to an era of
increased federal environmental protection. Both the Endangered
Species Preservation Act of 1966'9 and the Endangered Species
Conservation Act of 196950 bestowed some protection upon wild-
life. Neither of these laws, however, prevented the taking of endan-
gered species, nor required all federal agencies to sustain endan-
44. Environmental Defense Fund, 489 F.2d at 1256-57 (withdrawing DDT
registrations pursuant to FIFRA regulations provide for all five core NEPA is-
sues, thus the functional equivalent to NEPA was provided so no EIS is re-
quired); Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that when
the EPA registered pesticides pursuant to FIFRA, then NEPA does not apply).
45. Western Nebraska Resources Council v. United States EPA, 943 F.2d 867,
871-72 (8th Cir. 1991). The "EPA does not need to comply with the formal re-
quirements of NEPA in performing its environmental protection functions under
'organic legislation [that] mandates specific procedures for considering the envi-
ronment that are functional equivalents of' the EIS process. Id. at 871-72 (quot-
ing Alabama v. United States EPA, 911 F.2d 499, 504 (11 th Cir. 1990)). In addi-
tion, the Safe Drinking Water Act is such legislation as its procedures and analy-
sis encompass core NEPA concerns. Id. at 872.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a).
47. Id. § 4332(c).
48. See text accompanying note 39.
49. Pub. L. No. 89-669, 80 Stat. 926 (1966), repealed by Endangered Species
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205 § 14, 87 Stat. 884, 903.
50. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275 (1969), repealed by Endangered Species
Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205 § 14, 87 Stat. 884, 903.
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gered species.51 Dissatisfaction with this ineffective protection
sparked statutory reform.52
The congressional solution for comprehensive species protection
was the Endangered Species Act, enacted in 1973."3 ESA was
passed to preserve ecosystems upon which endangered and threat-
ened species depend,54 and was drafted in response to the general
realization that untempered economic development had rendered
various species of fish, wildlife, and plants extinct. Congress felt
compelled to protect those species that "maintain a 'balance of
nature' within their environments," acknowledging that protecting
endangered species surpasses mere asthetic concerns. 6 Further,
Congress realized that biological diversity is vital to continued
scientific development.57 The Supreme Court deemed ESA "[t]he
51. James Salzman, Evolution and Application of Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act, 14 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 311, 312 (1990).
52. Congress acknowledged the need for statutory reform:
The development of the land ... was slowly whittling down the nest-
ing and breeding grounds on which many species depend. Environ-
mental pollution was weakening the capacity of some species to gen-
erate their own kind. Commercial exploitation, whether through
thoughtlessness, ignorance, or greed, was reducing certain animal
populations to the danger level. Species which had survived
for thousands and thousands of years were suddenly in danger.
Endangered Species Conservation Act of 1972: Hearings on S. 3818 Before the
Subcomm. on the Env't of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1972) (statement of Sen. William B.
Spong, Jr.).
53. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). See George Coggins, Conserving Wildlife
Resources: An Overview of the Endangerd Species Act of 1973, 51 N.D. L. REv.
315 (1974).
54. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) ("The purpose of [ESA] is to provide a means
whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved .... "). "Species" includes any subspecies of wildlife,
fish or plants. Id. § 1532(16).
55. Id. § 1531(a)(1) ("[V]arious species of fish, wildlife, and plants in the
United States have been rendered extinct as a consequence of economic growth
and development untempered by adequate concern and conservation.").
56. S. REP. No. 307, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2989, 2990.
57. Id.
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most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered
species enacted by any nation."58
ESA's main goal is to prevent species extinction caused by hu-
man influence on ecosystems." To be included on ESA's list of
endangered' and threatened 6' species, a species must be nominat-
ed by either the Secretary of Interior or Secretary of Commerce.62
The decision to list a species must be based solely on "the best
scientific and commercial data available., 63 The Secretary deter-
mines whether a species is endangered or threatened after consider-
ing each of the following five factors: (1) "the present or threatened
destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range, '64
(2) "over utilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or edu-
cational purposes,, 65 (3) "disease or predation,"'  (4) "inadequacy
58. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 195 (1978) (affirming im-
position of permanent injunction to prevent completion of dam that would eradi-
cate the snail darter).
59. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455.
60. "Endangered species" is defined as "any species which is in danger of
extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range .... " 16 U.S.C.
§ 1532(6) (1994).
. 61. "Threatened species" means "any species which is likely to become an
endangered species within the foreseeable future throughout all or a significant
portion of its range." Id. § 1532(20).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2) (1988 & Supp V 1993). Under ESA, it is the
Secretary who prepares and reviews the list of endangered species. Id. The Secre-
tary of Commerce, acting under the National Marine Fisheries Service is empow-
ered to designate the status of marine fish and some marine mammals. The Sec-
retary of Interior, functioning through the United States Fish & Wildlife Service,
is authorized to designate all other wildlife. Barbara Craig, The Federal Endan-
gered Species Act, ADVOC., Oct. 1995, at 12. The Secretary of Commerce or the
Secretary of Interior will be designated as "Secretary" for the purpose of this
note. Also, for further clarity, the term "Service" will be used in reference to
either the National Marine Fisheries Service or the United States Fish & Wildlife
Service.
63. 42 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1994).
64. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(A).
65. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(B).
66. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(C).
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of existing regulatory mechanisms," 67 and (5) "other natural or
manmade factors affecting its continued existence. 68
ESA encourages the Secretary to spend no more than 90 days to
determine if the data presents substantial evidence to warrant listing
the species as endangered. 69 The Secretary may determine whether
the nomination is warranted,70
is not warranted71, or is warranted but precluded.72
B. Determining Critical Habitat
Congress has identified habitat loss as the "major cause [of] the
extinction of species worldwide. '73 Thus, when a species is listed
as endangered or threatened, the Secretary, "to the maximum extent
prudent and determinable," must simultaneously designate "critical
habitat. 74
The initial determination of critical habitat is based on the "best
scientific data available., 75 This requires determining geographic
67. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(D).
68. Id. § 1533(a)(1)(E).
69. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(A). This 90 day limit is softened with the language "to
the maximum extent practicable . I... Id. The Secretary may take no longer than
12 months. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B).
70. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(ii). If listing is warranted, the Secretary must publish
"a general notice and the complete text of a proposed regulation to implement
such action .... " Id.
71. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(i). If listing is unwarranted then the species is not
listed. In this case the Secretary must publish this finding in the Federal Register.
Id.
72. Id. § 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii). Nominations are precluded by "pending proposals
to determine whether any species is" endangered or threatened. Id.
§ 1533(b)(3)(B)(iii)(I). Preclusion requires expeditious progress to list qualified
species threatened or endangered, and to remove species that no longer require
such protection. Id. § 1533(3)(B)(iii)(II).
73. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9455.
74. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3). "Critical habitat" is the geographical area "essen-
tial to the conservation of the species." Id. § 1532(5)(A).
75. Id. § 1533(b)(2). Thus, the Secretary has an affirmative duty to identify
relevant biological and economic data necessary to make a designation of critical
habitat prior to listing the species as endangered or threatened. See id.
§ 1531(a)(5); 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a).
407
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areas containing the biological features "essential to the conserva-
tion of [the] species."76 The Secretary must also consider econom-
ic factors, as well as other relevant impacts of specifying an area as
critical habitat.
7
While critical habitat designation generally must occur concur-
rently with the listing decision, 78 there is an exception when criti-
cal habitat is not "determinable" or when designation is not "pru-
dent".79 Critical habitat may not be "determinable" if there is "sub-
stantial disagreement regarding the sufficiency or accuracy of the
available data relevant to the determination. 0 If critical habitat is
not "determinable," the Secretary has an additional twelve months
to make the designation, based on available data.8 A critical habi-
tat designation is not "prudent" if such designation is not beneficial
to the species.82
76. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(b) (listing suggested criteria for critical habitat desig-
nation).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). Before issuing a critical habitat designation, the
Secretary must (1) publish notice and the complete text of such designation in the
Federal Register; (2) give notice to each state affected by the regulation; (3) give
notice to appropriate professional scientific organizations; (4) publish a summary
of such designation in newspapers of potentially affected areas; and (5) hold a
public hearing if requested. Id. § 1533(b)(5)(A)-(E).
78. Id. § 1533(a)(3).
79. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(c)(ii).
80. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(B)(i).
81. Id. § 1533(b)(6)(C). The Secretary must state reasons for not designating
critical habitat in the proposed and final listing. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a). The not
"determinable" time extension was codified because Congress realized that "it
may be difficult to determine the most appropriate critical habitat within the
time" allowed by legislation. H.R. REP. No. 567, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1982),
reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2807, 2819.
82. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12(a)(1). The two instances when designation of critical
habitat is not "prudent" are:
(i) The species is threatened by taking or other human
activity, and identification of critical habitat can be
expected to increase the degree of such threat to the
species, or
(ii) Such designation of critical habitat would not be
beneficial to the species.
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Designating an area as critical habitat prohibits subsequent feder-
al or federally funded activity likely to disrupt this habitat.83 ESA,
however, allows the Secretary to exclude any area from critical
habitat designation if the benefits of exclusion outweigh the bene-
fits of designation.84 The Secretary's discretion, however, is limit-
ed. An area must be designated as critical habitat if failure to do so
would result in extinction of the species.
C. Exemption from ESA Requirements
A federal agency, or the governor of the state where such agency
action is proposed, may apply to the Secretary for exemption from
ESA requirements.86 To apply for an exemption, the Secretary
must have concluded that the proposed action would jeopardize the
existence of a species or its critical habitat.87 The Secretary must
also make a recommendation concerning the application for exemp-
tion to the Endangered Species Committee.88 The Committee has
thirty days to determine whether an exemption has been granted,89
based upon its examination of the Secretary's recommendation and
factors mandated under ESA.9° The Committee then determines
For example, the critical habitat was found not prudent in the protection
of Lysimachia asperulaefolia, an herb with yellow flowers and potential horti-
cultural uses. The Service justified its decision not to list the herb by stating
that increased publicity and specific location information connected with criti-
cal habitat designation could have resulted in people collecting the species. 51
Fed. Reg. 12,451, 12,453 (1986).
83. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). "The Secretary must consult with other federal
agencies to ensure that governmental actions do not 'result in the destruction or
adverse modification' of land designated as critical habitat." Northern Spotted
Owl v. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. 621, 623 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
85. See id. § 1533(a),(d).
86. Id. § 1536(g)(1).
87. Id.
88. Id. § 1536(g). The Committee is comprised of at least seven members.
The members are the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of the Army, Chairman
of the Council of Economic Advisors, Administrator of the EPA, Secretary of the
Interior, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
and a representative from each affected state. Id. § 1536(e)(3).
89. Id. § 1536(h).
90. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A). The factors to be considered are:
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whether the exemption establishes reasonable mitigation and en-
hancement measures necessary to minimize adverse affects on the
species or its critical habitat.9
ESA's aim is to ensure the federal agency conservation of endan-
gered and threatened species.92 To accomplish this goal, ESA sets
forth the procedures for listing species as threatened or endan-
gered.93 In addition, ESA also mandates with limited exceptions,
that the habitat of a listed species be designated as "critical."94
Such determinations protect the species from future harm.95
III APPLICABILITY OF NEPA TO ESA
The fundamental purpose of both NEPA and ESA is to protect
the environment. Presently, there is a dispute in the federal courts
as to how these two statutes should operate within the context of
designating critical habitat. While federal appellate courts have
issued conflicting rulings, the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the
disparity. Recently, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits addressed how
NEPA and ESA should be interpreted when acting in conjunction
with one another.
A. Ninth Circuit's Analysis of NEPA's Role in Designating
Critical Habitat under ESA
(i) there are no reasonable and prudent alternatives to the agency
action;
(ii) the benefits of such action clearly outweigh the
benefits of alternative courses of action consistent with conserv-
ing the species or its critical habitat, and such action is in the
public interest;
(iii) the action is of regional or national significance; and
(iv) neither the Federal agency concerned nor theexemption
applicant made any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of
resources prohibited by subsection (d) of this section ....
Id. § 1536(h)(1)(A)(i)-(iv).
91. Id. § 1536(h)(1)(B).
92. Id. § 1531(b).
93. Id. § 1533.
94. Id. § 1533(a)(3).
95. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
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1. District Court Ruling
The northern spotted owl inhabits old-growth forests in western
Washington, Oregon, northwestern California, and southwestern
British Columbia.96 Old growth forests are comprised of conifers
that are at least 200 years old, fallen branches, and standing dead
trees that are capable of supporting plant and animal life.97 Over
the past decades, these forests have been significantly reduced by
clearing for urban development and agriculture, fires, and, most
significantly, by logging.98 The northern spotted owl population
has disappeared in certain areas and declined in others as a result of
this habitat destruction." Some scientists have called the federal
management policy towards these owls "a prescription for the[ir]
extinction. ' ' "°
In 1973, an interagency committee concerned with a significant
population reduction, suggested listing the Spotted Owl under
ESA. 1' In 1987, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("Service") denied a petition to list the northern spotted owl as
96. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990).
97. See Jeb Boyt, Comment, Struggling to Protect Ecosystems and
Biodiversity Under NEPA and NFMA: The Ancient Forests of the Pacific North-
west and The Northern Spotted Owl, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 1009, 1012-14
(1993).
98. Victor M. Sher, Travels With Strix: The Spotted Owl's Journey Through
the Federal Courts, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 41 (1993). The United States Forest
Service sold close to 71,000 acres of owl habitat every year during the late 1980s
and the Bureau of Land Management has logged an additional 15,000 acres each
year thoughout the late 1980s. Id.
99. Id. Only ten percent of the United States forests contain old growth coni-
fers. Michael C. Blumm, Ancient Forests, Spotted Owls, and Modern Public
Land Law, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 605, 607 (1991).
100. Old growth not set aside for protection will disappear within twenty to
fifty years. See Catherine Caufield, The Ancient Forest, NEW YORKER, May 14,
1990, at 46.
101. Victor M. Sher & Andy Stahl, Spotted Owls, Ancient Forests, Courts and
Congress: An Overview of Citizens' Efforts to Protect Old-Growth Forests and
the Species That Live in Them, 6 NORTHWEST ENVTL. J. 361, 363 (1987).
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"endangered."' 0 2 The Service, however, did not refute scientific
evidence indicating that the species was endangered.' 3
The Service's refusal to protect the owl led to an immediate
challenge by environmental groups."° In 1988, the District Court
for the Western District of Washington determined that the Service
had "disregarded all the expert opinion on population viability,
including that of its own expert, that the owl is facing extinction,
and instead merely asserted its expertise in support of its conclu-
sions."' 5 The court stated that the Service had failed to provide
any analysis supporting its decision not to list the owl, and that
"[s]uch analysis is necessary to establish a rational connection be-
tween the evidence presented and the Service's decision.""'6 The
court thus found that the Service's decision not to list the owl was
"arbitrary and capricious." 107
In response to the district court's ruling, the Secretary listed the
northern spotted owl as a "threatened" species under ESA, effective
July 23, 1990.08 In this listing, however, the Secretary deferred
the designation of critical habitat on the grounds of insufficient
information." In Spotted Owl v. Lujan,"° environmentalists
102. 52 Fed. Reg. 48,552 (1987). Plaintiff Greenworld had petitioned the Ser-
vice to list the owl as endangered pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3). Northern
Spotted Owl v. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. 479, 480 (W.D. Wash. 1988).
103. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 481. In fact, the Service's own staff expert on
population viability concluded that "the most reasonable interpretation of current
data and knowledge indicate continued old growth harvesting is likely to lead to
the extinction of the subspecies in the foreseeable future which argues strongly
for listing the subspecies as threatened or endangered at this time." Id.
104. See e.g., id. at 479-80. The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund brought suit
on behalf of 23 conservation organizations that challenged the Service's decision
not to list the northern spotted owl as "threatened." 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,118
(1990). See Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 480. The court remanded the matter to the
Service after ruling that the decision had been arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 483.
105. Hodel, 716 F. Supp. at 483.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114 (1990). The Service had proposed the listing in June
of 1989. 54 Fed. Reg. 26,666 (1989).
109. 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,192 (1990).
110. 758 F. Supp. 621 (W.D. Wash. 1991).
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brought suit seeking injunctive relief compelling critical habitat
designation.
.In Lujan, the Secretary claimed that critical habitat was "not
determinable" when it issued its final listing.11' The court, howev-
er, found that the Service had abused its discretion by failing to
designate a critical habitat for the northern spotted owl."1 In its
ruling, the court stressed the importance of such a designation,
stating that the "designation of critical habitat is a central compo-
nent of the legal scheme developed by Congress to prevent the
permanent loss of species."' 1 3 The court stated that the Secretary
neglected to justify his failure to designate critical habitat, as re-
quired under ESA." 4 The court found a lack of effort by the Sec-
retary to determine critical habitat, or to explain why critical habitat
was not determinable." 5 The court ordered the Secretary to pub-
lish its final critical habitat plan "at the earliest time" permitted
under appropriate regulations." 6
Consequently, on May 6, 1991, the Secretary proposed designat-
ing 11,638,195 acres of land as critical habitat."7 The Secretary
did not, however, prepare an EIS in connection with this designa-
tion." 8 The Secretary relied on a 1983 agency policy advising that
the Service would no longer prepare Environmental Assessments
("EA's") in connection with regulations adopted pursuant to
111. Id. at 624.
112. Id. at 629.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 628.
115. Id. Evidence actually indicates that the Service was well aware of the
owl's critical habitat. See 55 Fed. Reg. 26,114, 26,175 (1990). The Service ad-
mitted in June 1990 that the northern spotted owl is "overwhelmingly associated"
with old-growth forests. Id. After this admission, the Service conceded "that
much of the remaining unprotected spotted owl habitat could disappear within 20
to 30 years, and on [sic] some forests, the unprotected habitat could disappear
within 10 years." Id.
116. Lujan, 758 F. Supp. at 630. The Service was ordered to submit to the
court, by March 15, 1991, a plan for determining critical habitat for the owl. Id.
at 629.
117. 56 Fed. Reg. 20,816, 20,820 (1991). This land included 190 critical habi-
tat areas in California, Oregon and Washington. Id. The Secretary also planned
four public hearings to receive comments. Id. at 20,823-824.
118. Id. at 20,824. Not preparing an EA precludes issuing an EIS. Id.
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ESA."9 The Secretary revised the proposed critical habitat desig-
nation on August 13, 1991.120 Then, on January 15th, 1992, the
Secretary issued the final critical habitat designation without filing
either an EA or EIS. z'
An Oregon municipality, Douglas County, filed suit on Septem-
ber 25, 1991, in federal district court, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that the Secretary had violated ESA and NEPA, and injunc-
tive relief prohibiting the Secretary from designating critical habitat
for the northern spotted owl until an EA or EIS was prepared. 22
119. Id. See 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983). This policy become effective Septem-
ber 21, 1983. Id. . The policy was based on four considerations. Id. First, the
Council on Environmental Quality ("CEQ") recommended this procedural change.
Id. The CEQ's "interpretation of NEPA is entitled to substantial deference."
Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979). Second, in the decade preced-
ing this procedural change, the Service approved approximately 130 EAs pursuant
to § 4(a) of ESA, "none of which resulted in a decision to prepare an ... [EIS]."
48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983). Third, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had found
that an EIS was not required for listing endangered species under ESA. Id. at
49,244-245 (citing Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835 (6th Cir.
1981)). Specifically, the court in Pacific Legal Foundation held that compliance
with NEPA requirements when listing a species under ESA "does not and cannot
serve the purpose" of ESA. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 835
(6th Cir. 1981). Finally, the Service established this new policy in light of the
fact that listing species under ESA are to be determined without regard to eco-
nomic or socioeconomic factors. 48 Fed. Reg. 49,245 (1983).
120. 56 Fed. Reg. 40,002 (1991). This revision reduced the critical habitat to
approximately 8,200,000 acres. Id. at 40,011. Another four public hearing were
held. Id. at 40,002. The Secretary made two designation proposals to promote
additional consideration of the economic effect of critical habitat designation and
allow opportunity for public comment. Id. Prior to this, on May 30, 1991, Doug-
las County submitted comments with the Secretary claiming that the Secretary
had failed to comply with NEPA. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1498
(9th Cir. 1995).
121. 57 Fed. Reg. 1,796 (1992). This designation reduced the critical habitat to
approximately 6,887,000 acres, comprised solely of federal land in California,
Oregon, and Washington. Id. at 1,809.
122. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470 (D. Or. 1992). The County's
fundamental claim was that the Secretary failed to comply with NEPA when
designating the critical habitat. Id. at 1474. Some of the county's specific claims
were: that the Service violated NEPA by failing to develop alternatives to the fi-
nal critical habitat designation; that the Service violated NEPA and ESA by fail-
ing to consider the "social and economic impacts of designating a particular area
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The court first determined that the action was governed by NEPA
regulations since the activity qualified as "major federal action"
affecting the "quality of the human environment."' 23  The
Secretary's main argument was that, following the Sixth Circuit's
holding in Pacific Legal Foundation v. Andrus, the Secretary was
exempt from NEPA when making critical habitat designations.1
2 4
The court rejected this argument, stating that the statutory require-
ment for filing an EIS when "listing" species may be distinguished
from the requirement that an EIS be prepared when designating
"critical habitat."'25 The court held that NEPA applies to the
Secretary's designation, and granted an injunction until compliance
with NEPA was satisfied.'26 The court reasoned that since an EIS
must be prepared whenever the proposed activity has "a significant
impact on the quality of the human environment," the applicability
of NEPA could not be determined without first preparing an EA or
EIS.'27 The district court concluded that "it is only through the
analysis mandated by NEPA that the true impacts of an agency
action can be identified and evaluated."'
2 8
2. Ninth Circuit
Whether NEPA applies to the Secretary's designation of critical
habitat under ESA was an issue of first impression for the Ninth
Circuit. In Douglas County v. Babbitt,'29 the Secretary 3 ° argued
as critical habitat;" and that the Service violated NEPA and ESA by failing take
into account other impacts of the designation. Id.
123. Id. at 1478. The court stated that the designation constituted major federal
action since it affected approximately 6.9 million acres of land. Id. Additionally,
the court found that because the designation would "impact the economy, em-
ployment, public health, and social services" in the area, the action "affects the
'quality of the human environment."' Id.
124. Id. at 1477; see Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir.
1981) (holding that the Secretary is legally exempt from NEPA when listing
species as threatened or endangered under ESA).
125. Douglas County, 810 F. Supp. at 1479.
126. Id. at 1484-85.
127. Id. at 1482.
128. Id.
129. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
116 S.Ct. 698 (1996).
130. Bruce Babbitt, the Secretary of Interior, replaced Manuel Lujan as a de-
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that NEPA did not apply to critical habitat designations under
ESA.' The Ninth Circuit agreed, holding "that NEPA does not
apply to the designation of a critical habitat" under ESA.' The
court's reasoning was three-fold. First, the court determined that
ESA procedures have displaced NEPA's requirements. 33 Second,
the court stated that an EIS is not required for actions preserving
the physical environment.'34 Lastly, the court held that Congress
intended ESA to supplant NEPA's procedural requirements when
making critical habitat determinations.'35 Thus, the Service was
not required to prepare an EA or EIS before taking measures to
protect the physical environment.'36
In summary, the federal district court held that the Secretary had
to designate a critical habitat when listing the northern spotted owl
as a threatened species.'37 Accordingly, the Secretary designated
critical habitat for the owl, but refused to file an EIS.'38 Subse-
quently, the district court enjoined the Secretary from designating
critical habitat until it complied with NEPA.' 9 On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that NEPA does not
apply to critical habitat designations under ESA."
B. Tenth Circuit's Interpretation of NEPA's Role in Designating
Critical Habitat under ESA
1. Lower Court Ruling
fendant. Id. at 1499 n.2.
131. Id. at 1499.
132. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1502-05.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1505.
135. Id. at 1507.
136. See infra part IV.B. for a complete discussion of arguments that support
this view.
137. See discussion supra notes 114-117 and accompanying text.
138. See discussion supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
139. See discussion supra notes 123-129 and accompanying text.
140. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1502 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996).
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On July 1, 1986, the Service listed a freshwater fish, "spikedace,"
as a threatened species under ESA. 14' The spikedace inhabits
moderate to large streams and is indigenous to the entire Gila River
stream system upstream of Phoenix, Arizona, but was found to
exist only in small portions of this riparian area. 42 Habitat de-
struction caused by damming, channel alteration, channel
downcutting, riparian destruction and groundwater pumping severe-
ly reduced the spikedace population.'43
On October 28, 1986, the Service also listed the "loach minnow"
as an endangered species.' 44 Of approximately square 2,600 ki-
lometers of Arizona and New Mexico stream habitat historically
occupied by the loach minnow, only 360 kilometers still support
this species. 45 Destruction of habitat by impoundment, channel
downcutting, substrate sedimentation, groundwater pumping, water
diversion, and the introduction of exotic competitive fish species
significantly reduced the loach minnow population.'"
In March 1994, the Secretary issued "notice of final designation
of critical habitat" for the two species pursuant to ESA, effective
April 7, 1994."7 As in the case of the northern spotted owl, the
141. 51 Fed. Reg. 23,769 (1986).
142. Id. The historic extent of the spikedace's habitat may have included parts
of Mexico but this habitat has been destroyed by de-watering of the river. Id.
Only approximately six percent of the historic range now supports the spikedace.
Id.
143. Id.
144. 51 Fed. Reg. 39,468 (1986).
145. Id.
146. Id. The species continues to be threatened primarily by a proposed dam
construction, habitat alteration, and exotic species. Id.
147. 59 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (1994) (loach minnow); 59 Fed. Reg. 10,906 (1994)
(spikedace). The Secretary had also made an initial proposal for the loach min-
now, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,380 (1985), and for the spikedace, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,390
(1985). The Secretary provided a comment period and scheduled three public
meetings concerning the proposed actions. 50 Fed. Reg. 37,703-704 (1985).
The designated critical habitat for the loach minnow included approximately
257 kilometers of sections of the Gila River in Grant and Catron counties, New
Mexico; the San Francisco and Tularosa rivers and Dry Blue Creek, Catron
County, New Mexico; the San Francisco and Blue rivers and Campbell Blue
Creek, Greenlee County, Arizona; and Aravaipa Creek in Graham and Pinal
counties, Arizona. 59 Fed. Reg. 10,898 (1994).
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Secretary concluded that making a critical habitat designation did
not require NEPA compliance."4 In opposition to the final desig-
nation of critical habitat, Catron County, in New Mexico, demanded
that an EIS be prepared pursuant to NEPA 49
Specifically, Catron County sued for injunctive relief on the
grounds that the Secretary failed to comply with NEPA.' ° The
County sought an injunction that would prohibit the Secretary from
implementing the critical habitat designation. The district court held
that the Secretary failed to comply with NEPA when designating
the critical habitat and granted the injunction, prohibiting the Secre-
tary from listing the loach minnow and spikedace as threatened or
endangered until an EIS was filed. 5' The Service appealed to the
Tenth Circuit.
2. Tenth Circuit
In Catron County Board of Commissioners v. United States Fish
& Wildlife Service,'52 the Tenth Circuit, for the first time, faced
the issue of whether the Secretary must comply with NEPA before
designating critical habitat under ESA.53 The court stated that
compliance with NEPA is excused only in two instances.'54 First,
NEPA compliance is excepted when there is a statutory conflict
with the federal agency's "authorizing legislation [or regulations]
N
The Secretary designated a total of approximately 154 kilometers of land as
critical habitat for the spikedace. This land included sections of the Gila River in
Grant and Catron counties, New Mexico; the Verde River in Yavapai County,
Arizona; and the Aravaipa Creek in Pinal and Graham counties, Arizona. 59 Fed.
Reg. 10,906 (1994).
148. 50 Fed. Reg. 25,385 (1985) (loach minnow); 50 Fed. Reg. 25,395 (1985)
(spikedace). The Secretary claimed that secretarial actions under ESA do not
have to comply with NEPA, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,385; 50 Fed. Reg. 25,395 (1985)
(citing 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 as authority).
149. See Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife
Serv., 75 F.3d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1996).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1435.
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that prohibits or renders compliance impossible.""' Second,
NEPA compliance is excused under the "functional equivalency"
test. 56 The Tenth Circuit found that neither exception to NEPA
applied when designating critical habitat pursuant to ESA. 7
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary must com-
ply with NEPA before designating critical habitat under ESA.58
Unlike NEPA, the court reasoned that ESA does not take into ac-
count the affects that a critical habitat designation has on the hu-
man environment.5 9 Additionally, the federal government has lit-
tle recourse after designation to correct mistakes."6 Therefore, to
ensure that all environmental consequences are assessed before
designating critical habitat, the Tenth Circuit held that an EA, and
possibly an EIS, must be prepared under NEPA. 6'
IV. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS: ANALYSIS NINTH AND
TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
In light of the prevalent impact of ESA regulations in the United
States, either the courts or Congress must resolve the issue of
whether NEPA applies to a Secretary's decision to designate critical
habitat pursuant to ESA. 62 An ordered and reliable system of en-
vironmental regulation demands the resolution of this ambiguity.
Although the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have both presented persua-
sive arguments, the Supreme Court has yet to address this ques-
tion.63 A structured analysis of both interpretations may shed use-
ful light on a proper resolution of the judicial dispute.
155. Id.
156. Id. The Catron County court defines functional equivalency as being "sub-
ject to rules and regulations that essentially duplicate the NEPA inquiry." Id.
157. Id. at 1439.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1434.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1439.
162. See JOHN DAVIDSON & ORLANDO E. DELOGU, 2 FEDERAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL REGULATION 15-1 (1994) (ESA "has a substantive impact on virtually all
facets of federal decision making").
163. Recently, the Supreme Court chose not to resolve this Circuit split. Doug-
las County v. Babbitt, 116 S. Ct. 698 (1996) (denying certiori to Douglas County
v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995)).
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A. NEPA Requirements Govern the Secretary's Designation of
Critical Habitat
1. NEPA and ESA: Neither Functionally Equivalent Nor in Direct
Conflict.
Non-compliance with NEPA is only permitted when there is a
direct statutory conflict, rendering compliance with both statutes
impossible, or when "duplicative procedural requirements" between
the statutes "constitute[] 'functional [equivalency]' rendering com-
pliance with both superfluous."'" In Catron County, the Secretary
relied on the functionally equivalent exception.'65 This exception
is inapplicable to NEPA and ESA regarding critical habitat designa-
tions because their respective functions are far from equivalent.
First, NEPA and ESA have different purposes. NEPA examines a
proposed action's affect on the human environment. 66 It ensures
that federal agencies make informed decisions when their actions
affect that environment, 67 and permits dissemination of relevant
information to outside parties potentially affected by such ac-
tions. 68 In contrast, ESA's primary purpose is to prevent the ex-
tinction of species by protecting their habitat from human activi-
ty.'69 Although ESA's protection of species and habitat is per se
an environmentally beneficial objective, the effects of a critical
habitat designation pursuant to ESA is not duplicated by NEPA, but
rather, bolstered.7
164. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1435. See supra part I.B.
165. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1436. The court noted that the Secretary did
not allege that a statutory conflict existed rendering compliance impossible. Id. In
Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., time constraints
under the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act necessarily prevented filing of
an EIS. 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994). Specifically, NEPA was enacted "to cre-
ate and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive
harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and
future generations of Americans." Id. § 4331(a).
167. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1437.
168. Id. (citing Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332,
349 (1989)). This informs the public that environmental impacts of the action
were considered. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. ("Secretarial action under ESA is not inevitably beneficial or immune
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Second, NEPA and ESA are not procedurally functionally equiva-
lent. Although, under ESA, the Secretary must follow procedural
notice requirements that are similar to NEPA requirements,1 71
NEPA additionally mandates that alternatives to proposed actions
be considered.172 ESA has no similar requirement. Thus, ESA reg-
ulations governing critical habitat designations are procedurally dis-
tinct from NEPA requirements.
The court in Douglas County argued that any procedural distinc-
tion is harmless because critical habitat designations are preserving
of the status quo and therefore do not negatively impact the envi-
ronment. 73 A critical habitat designation, however, can cause neg-
ative impacts.7 4 For example, in Catron County, designation of
critical habitat prevented the county from diverting and impounding
water within the designated area. 75 The designation had the po-
tential of resulting in the flooding of fairgrounds, roads, and bridg-
es. 176 Thus, the designation of a critical habitat can have a direct
impact on the human environment because ESA does not specifical-
ly require the Secretary to take the human environment into ac-
count.'77 This impact may remain unknown without preparation of
an EIS pursuant to NEPA. ESA suggests that the Secretary take
"any other relevant impact" into account, 78 but this suggestion is
insufficient because it does not explicitly require the Secretary to
consider impacts on the human environment. Thus, NEPA regula-
tions should be followed to ensure that all the effects on the physi-
cal environment are factored into the equation of determining criti-
cal habitat.
to improvement by compliance with NEPA procedure.").
171. The requirements for ESA are contained in 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)
(1994).
172. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C)(iii).
173. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding
that "NEPA procedures do not apply to federal actions that do nothing to alter
the natural physical environment").
174. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75
F.3d 1429, 1436-37 (10th Cir. 1996).
175. Id. at 1433.
176. Id.
177. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
178. Id.
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Finally, to hold that ESA is "functionally equivalent" to NEPA
when determining critical habitat, and that, therefore, NEPA is
superfluous and does not apply, would limit the scope of NEPA to
only mandating assessment of negative impacts on the environ-
ment. 79 In other words, since critical habitat designations can be
seen as having no impact or as even benefiting the non-human
environment, to not apply NEPA would imply a negative impact
limitation. Such a narrow interpretation would considerably dimin-
ish NEPA's primary purpose, which is to help federal agencies
make decisions based upon environmental considerations "and take
actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment," 8 ' in-
cluding, specifically, the human environment. Since, NEPA and
ESA regulations are not functionally equivalent with respect to
critical habitat designations, the Secretary must comply with NEPA
when making such determinations.
2. Necessary Compliance with NEPA's "Fullest Possible Extent"
Requirement
Partial compliance with NEPA's requirements is insufficient. The
unambiguous language of NEPA makes it clear that federal agen-
cies must comply with NEPA, "to the fullest extent possible." 8 '
Moreover, NEPA mandates preparation of an EIS for any "major
Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human
environment." '82
There exists no method of completely determining the effect of
activity on the environment without preparing an EIS. Although
ESA directs the Secretary to take into account economic and other
relevant impacts, 83 this is merely a "cursory directive" that does
not displace NEPA requirements. 84 The full range of effects of
179. NEPA requires EISs to include social, economic, and other non-physical
impacts. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a). NEPA seeks to "assure for all Americans safe,
beautiful, [and] productive... surroundings." Id. § 4331(b)(2). In addition,
NEPA aims to "permit high standards of living." Id. § 4331(b)(5).
180. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1437 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1994)).
181. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
182. Id. § 4332(2)(C).
183. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
184. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75
F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996).
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proposed governmental actions are often unknown. 8 For exam-
ple, the potential flooding in Catron County caused by designation
of critical habitat would not be considered pursuant to ESA because
ESA only requires the Secretary to consider the impact on the en-
dangered species' environment in order to prevent its extinc-
tion. 1
6
Consequently, ESA's notice requirements and environmental
considerations, which do not include the preparation of an EIS only
partially satisfy NEPA's purposes. Yet anything less than preparing
an EIS would be a violation of Congress' mandate that federal
agencies must comply with NEPA "to the fullest extent possi-
ble."18
7
3. The Need for Comprehensive Assessment
Apart from the "fullest extent possible" language, the text of
ESA itself implies the necessity of an EIS in order to make fully
informed decisions concerning critical habitat designations. The
Secretary can only make a critical habitat designation "after a thor-
ough survey of all of the available data." '88 ESA calls for a full
investigation into a critical habitat designation. 89 The preparation
of an EA enables all parties involved to comprehensively assess the
effect of a particular activity on the environment. 90 Thus, an in-
vestigation cannot be complete without preparation of an EA or
EIS. 191
185. Id. at 1437. Specifically, the court stated that government action is often,
"initially thought to be beneficial, but after closer analysis determined to be envi-
ronmentally harmful." Id.
186. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (although the statute mentions human consid-
erations such as "economic" and "any other relevant impact," it specifically man-
dates that a critical habitat be designated if failure to do so would "result in the
extinction of the species concerned.").
187. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
188. H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9464.
189. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2). "The Secretary shall designate critical habitat...
on the basis of the best scientific data available." Id.
190. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75
F.3d 1429, 1436 (10th Cir. 1996).
191. Federal agencies would not know potential effects of and alternatives to
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B. Inapplicability of NEPA to Designation of Critical Habitat
under ESA.
1. Congressional Waiver
When an administrative agency interprets a statute and Congress
does not subsequently revise the statute, the administrative inter-
pretation is deemed valid because Congress has waived its opportu-
nity to change the administrative interpretation.'92 The Ninth Cir-
cuit relied on the congressional waiver argument in a prior case
analogous to the NEPA and ESA critical habitat designation cases.
In Merrell v. Thomas,' the Ninth Circuit held that NEPA does
not apply when EPA registers pesticides pursuant to FIFRA' 94
The court based its holding on the legislative history of FIFRA,
which illustrates that Congress created separate registration mecha-
nisms in FIFRA and NEPA' 95 In addition, the court stated that
Congress had declined the opportunity to apply NEPA to actions
pursuant to FIFRA' 96 Congress created FIFRA after NEPA's en-
actment without referring to NEPA' 97 Specifically, "Congress cre-
ated a registration procedure ... that apparently made NEPA
[registration] superfluous."'98 Additionally, Congress subsequently
amended FIFRA in 1975, 1978 and 1984,199 each time neglecting
to modify EPA's earlier interpretation that federal actions pursuant
to FIFRA did not have to comply with NEPA. Thus, the court
concluded, in light of Congress' inaction, that Congress "did not
proposed federal activity until they comply with NEPA and prepare an EA. Id. at
1437.
192. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986).
193. 807 F.2d 776 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
194. Id. at 778.
195. H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1971). In 1972, Congress
amended FIFRA "in part in response to 'increasing public concern over the uses
and application of pesticides [reflecting] expanded interest in environmental pro-
tection by many citizens." Id.
196. Merrell, 807 F.2d at 778 (citing H.R. REP. No. 511, 92d Cong., 1st Sess.
4 (1971)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 779.
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intend for NEPA to apply to FIFRA,"2" and the administrative
interpretation was valid.
An analysis of ESA's legislative history reveals similar congres-
sional inaction. The legislative history of ESA is compelling evi-
dence that Congress "intended ... ESA procedure for designating a
critical habitat [to] displace the NEPA requirements."2"1 In 1978,
eight years after NEPA's enactment, Congress amended ESA.0 2
These amendments furnished a procedure for critical habitat desig-
nations and permitted Congress to consider the economic impact of
such designations.2 3 A congressional committee's report stated
that "the legislation aims to improve the listing and the public no-
tice process" to ensure that the Secretary considers all available
information. °4 "This carefully crafted congressional mandate for
public participation in the designation process, like the FIFRA pro-
cedures reviewed in Merrell, displaces NEPA's procedural and
informational requirements. 2 5
In Merrell, the Ninth Circuit stated that applying NEPA to
FIFRA's pesticide registration process would "sabotage the delicate
machinery that Congress designed to register new pesticides. 20 6
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Douglas County,"7 stated that Con-
gress adopted "a specific process for the Secretary to follow when
addressing the needs of endangered species. 22 Therefore, requir-
ing the Secretary to prepare an EIS would hamper ESA's goal of
improving the environment.2'
200. Id. at 781.
201. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1505 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996).
202. Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751 (1978).
203. Id.
204. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1503 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978), reprinted in, U.S.C.C.A.N. 9453, 9464).
205. Id. Moreover, the critical habitat designation regulations are a "compro-
mise between disparate points of view." H.R. REP. No. 1625, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 13-14 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9463, 9464. This compro-
mise "leaves little room for impos[ing] ... NEPA requirements." Douglas Coun-
ty, 48 F.3d at 1503.
206. Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 848 (1987).
207. 48 F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996).
208. Id. at 1503.
209. Id. (quoting Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir.
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Douglas County argued, to the contrary, that the legislative histo-
ry of ESA is not analogous to the legislative history of FIFRA.10
To support this contention, the County cited a 1978 Conference
Committee Report on the ESA amendments211 which stated that
the amendments require that notice of a critical habitat designation
and any EA or EIS be supplied to potentially affected local govern-
ments.1 2 This report implied that ESA must adhere to NEPA's
requirements. This comment, however, is "far from a clear, consid-
ered indication of congressional intent."2 3 It does not specifically
require that the Secretary prepare an EA or EIS, but rather that the
Secretary should provide one to local governments in the event that
one has been prepared. 2 '4 The fact that the committee's language
did not become part of ESA 215 further supports the proposition
that this statement is unpersuasive.
Additionally, and more closely related to critical habitat determi-
nations under ESA, in 1981, the Sixth Circuit held that when the
Secretary listed a species as endangered or threatened, NEPA did
not apply.1 6 Consequently, in 1983, the Secretary failed to pre-
pare an EA.21 '7 Nonetheless, when Congress amended ESA again
in 1988 it did not modify the procedural critical habitat
provisions."8
In Douglas County, therefore, the Ninth Circuit stated that "when
Congress revisits a statute giving rise to a long standing administra-
1981)).
210. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting H. CONF. REP. No. 1804, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 27 (1978),
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9484, 9494).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. Because ESA does not include this statement, this supports the argu-
ment that an EIS does apply to critical habitat designations.
216. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 831 (6th Cir. 1981). The
court in Pacific Legal Foundation also suggested that the process of designating
critical habitat might be the functional equivalent of preparing an EIS. See id. at
835. In Douglas County, the court remarked that "[t]he defendants here do not
advance the functional equivalent argument, so we do not address it." Douglas
County, 48 F.3d at 1504 n.10.
217. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504; 48 Fed. Reg. 49,244 (1983).
218. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504.
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tive interpretation without pertinent change, the 'congressional fail-
ure to revise or repeal the agency's interpretation is persuasive
evidence that the interpretation is the one intended by Con-
gress."' 2 19 Congress' inaction, in light of the judicial interpreta-
tions in Merrell and Pacific Legal Foundation that exempted
NEPA, indicates that "Congress ... made an implicit choice to
accept the Secretary's policy not to prepare EISs when designating
critical habitats."2" Thus congressional acquiescence to these judi-
cial interpretations of ESA reveals that Congress did not intend for
NEPA to apply to critical habitat designations under ESA.
2. Direct Conflict between NEPA and ESA: ESA Applies to
Designations of Critical Habitat
ESA's mandate conflicts with NEPA's. 221 Pursuant to ESA the
Secretary must designate as critical any area that, if destroyed,
would render the species extinct.22 2 This lack of discretion is in
direct conflict with NEPA's requirement that the Secretary consider
the environmental impact of such designation. 223 Therefore, since
NEPA directly conflicts with ESA's narrower mandate, only ESA
procedures must be followed.224
219. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
846 (1986)); see also Merrell v. Thomas, 807 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1986).
220. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1504.
221. Id. at 1503.
222. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
223. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1503. See also Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d
593, 595 (10th Cir. 1972) (illustrating two statutes with different purposes that
were held as not conflicting). In Davis, the Tenth Circuit found that NEPA and
25 U.S.C. § 415, which regulates Secretarial approval of leases which are on
Indian lands did not conflict. Section 415 requires the Secretary to ensure that
sufficient consideration is given to the effect that a lease has "on the environment
of the uses to which the leased lands will be subject" before approving such leas-
es. 25 U.S.C. § 415. The government argued that NEPA conflicted with, and thus
did not apply under, § 415 actions, since § 415 required the Bureau of Indian af-
fairs to consider the environmental ramifications before authorizing leases. Davis,
469 F.2d at 595. Stating that § 415 did not require as in-depth of an analysis of
environmental effects as NEPA does, the court rejected the argument. Id. at 598.
Additionally, the court stated that § 415 only considered a more focused analysis
of issues regarding authorizing leases on Indian land. Id.
224. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
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3. NEPA's EIS Requirement: Unnecessary in Preserving the
Physical Environment
NEPA "provide[s] a mechanism [,the EIS,] to enhance or im-
prove the environment and prevent further irreparable damage.
21
The Supreme Court has stated that "NEPA does not require the
agency to assess every impact or effect of its proposed action, but
only the impact or effect on the environment.,126 In clarification,
the Court stated that the "context of the statute shows that Congress
was talking about the physical environment .... ,22' The Supreme
Court concluded its discussion by stating that "although NEPA
states its goals in sweeping terms of human health and welfare,
these goals are ends that Congress has chosen to pursue by means
of protecting the physical environment.""22
In light of the Supreme Court's guidance, the Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that, if NEPA's goal is to protect the physical environment
and an EIS informs agencies and the public of negative conse-
quences to the "land, sea, or air, then an EIS is unnecessary" if the
proposed activity does not alter the physical environment.2 2 ' Ac-
cordingly, a federal agency acting to prevent human interference
225. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1505 (quoting Pacific Legal Found. v Andrus,
657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981)).
226. Metropolitan Edison Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766,
772 (1983) (emphasis added).
227. Id. In Douglas County, the Ninth Circuit further clarified by stating that
the physical environment refers to "air, land and water." Douglas County, 48
F.3d at 1505.
228. Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 773.
229. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1505. The Ninth Circuit cited several cases in
support of this premise. Id. In Sabine River Auth. v. United States Dept. of Inte-
rior, 951 F.2d 669 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Texas Water Conservation
Ass'n v. Department of Interior, 113 S. Ct. 75 (1992), the Fifth Circuit deter-
mined that an EIS was not required when the federal government procured a
negative easement prohibiting the commercial development of certain Texas
wetlands. "[A] negative easement which prohibits development does not result in
the requisite 'change' to the physical environment." Id. at 680. An EIS is not
necessary "to leave nature alone." Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1505 (quoting
National Ass'n of Property Owners v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 1223, 1265 (D.
Minn. 1980), aff'd sub nom., Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir.
1981)).
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with the environment does not need to prepare an EIS pursuant to
NEPA.230
4. NEPA's EIS Requirement for Designating Critical Habitat
Hinders Purpose of ESA
NEPA was created for "promot[ing] human welfare by alerting
governmental actors to the effect of their proposed actions on the
physical environment., 231 In contrast, ESA's objective is to pre-
vent species extinction.232 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Secretary's designation of critical habitat necessarily furthers
NEPA's purpose, and that the requirement of preparing an EIS
would hinder the Secretary's attempt to improve the environ-
ment.233 This argument was based on the Sixth Circuit case, Pa-
cific Legal Foundation v Andrus.3
In Pacific Legal Foundation, the Tennessee Valley Authority
contracted to construct two dams on the Duck River to control
flooding, to provide electricity, and to create recreational areas.235
At around the same time, pursuant to ESA, the Secretary listed one-
hundred fifty-nine different endangered species. 36 Among these
species were seven different mussels, two of which would be ad-
versely affected by the construction of the dam." 7 This designa-
tion prevented construction of the dam.238 The Pacific Legal
Foundation and several Tennessee residents sued for an injunction
to remove the listing of the seven species as endangered, and ar-
gued that the Secretary violated NEPA by not filing an EIS prior to
listing the mussels.239
The Sixth Circuit stated several reasons why NEPA should not
apply to a Secretary's decision to list a species as threatened or
230. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1506.
231. Id. (quoting Metropolitan Edison, 460 U.S. at 772).
232. Id.
233. Id. (citing Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir.
1981)).
234. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 831.
235. Id. at 831.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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endangered."l First, the Sixth Circuit argued that ESA's substan-
tive regulations mandate that the Secretary may only consider "eco-
nomic and any other relevant impact" in designating critical habi-
tat." ' The court held that this limited the factors that the Secre-
tary could consider to economic ones directly related to the pres-
ervation of the species.242 Second, the Sixth Circuit stated that be-
cause the Secretary may only consider the factors set out in ESA
when designating critical habitat, it would not further NEPA's pur-
pose to apply NEPA to ESA, since ESA's concern is limited to
designating critical habitat.243 Alternatively, the court felt that the
decision to list "a species as endangered or threatened necessarily
furthers the purpose of NEPA even though no" EIS is required.2"
The Douglas County court clarified the Sixth Circuit's reasoning by
stating that designating critical habitat specifically protects the envi-
ronment from the human impact that NEPA seeks to prevent.24
This Note has outlined the arguments for and against requiring
compliance with NEPA when designating critical habitat under
ESA. The arguments for requiring compliance are that: (1) NEPA
and ESA are not functionally equivalent, (2) ESA must follow
NEPA procedures because NEPA requires compliance "to the full-
est extent possible," and (3) ESA itself demonstrates that NEPA
should apply to critical habitat designations. The arguments against
requiring NEPA compliance for critical habitat designations are
that: (1) Congress accepted administrative decisions not to comply
with NEPA when acting pursuant to ESA, (2) NEPA and ESA are
directly conflicting, thus only ESA must be followed, (3) NEPA
requirements do not require preparation of EIS's since ESA acts
only to preserve the physical environment, and (4) critical habitat
designations further NEPA's purpose, thus requiring NEPA compli-
ance would only interfere with ESA's objectives.
240. Id. at 835-40. The fourth reason was based on the legislative history. Id.
For a discussion about this type of argument see supra part IV.B.1.
241. Pacific Legal Found., 657 F.2d at 835.
242. See id. at 835.
243. Id. at 836.
244. Id. at 837.
245. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996).
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C. NEPA Compliance: Resolving the Judicial Conflict
The Tenth Circuit applied the correct interpretation of the law,
holding that the Secretary must comply with NEPA when designat-
ing critical habitat under ESA. Case law, legislative history, and the
statutes themselves all mandate this interpretation. The Ninth
Circuit's rationale for deciding does not survive the weight of au-
thority supplied by the Tenth Circuit. In addition, there are three
reasons why the Tenth Circuit's ruling is superior to the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning.
First, preparation of an EIS permits critical evaluation of an
agency's proposed action by parties outside that agency.2" In con-
trast, ESA protects species from extinction caused by human activi-
ty by protecting the habitat that a species depends on.247 Thus,
ESA's focus is on species and their habitat, whereas NEPA's focus
is on all effects of an activity on the environment. In light of ESA's
purpose and its cursory directive that the Secretary must consider
"economic and other relevant impact," the NEPA inquiry has not
been duplicated because there is nothing that requires the Secretary
to consider the factors encompassed under an EIS.
Although, when designating critical habitat, the Secretary must
follow procedures that do "to some extent parallel and perhaps
overlap" NEPA requirements,2" the ESA notice requirements only
partially fulfill NEPA's primary purpose which is to "inject envi-
ronmental consideration into the federal agency's decision making,"
and "inform the public that the agency" has considered the impact
on the environment.249 In contrast, ESA's goal is to prevent the
extinction of species by protecting their habitat.250 NEPA specifi-
246. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th
Cir. 1972).
247. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
248. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75
F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir. 1996).
249. Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Hawaii, 454 U.S. 139, 143
(1981)).
250. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b). See also id. § 1531(a)(4) (ESA's goal is to "con-
serve to the fullest extent practicable the various species of fish or wildlife and
plants facing extinction."). ESA aims to "provide a means whereby the ecosys-
tems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may be con-
served" to safeguard the fish, wildlife and plants. Id. § 1531(b).
19961
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cally states that federal agencies must comply "to the fullest extent
possible,"25' and through requiring the preparation of an EA or
EIS, NEPA ensures that a federal agency makes informed, carefully
calculated decisions when acting in a way as to affect the environ-
ment. 1 Critical habitat designation decisions pursuant to ESA are
improved when implemented in conjunction with NEPA regula-
tions, because compliance with NEPA will provide a more thorough
analysis of all the factors concerning critical habitat designations.
Thus, interpreting NEPA as merely requiring assessment of detri-
mental impacts on the environment would considerably diminish
NEPA's primary purpose, which is "to help public officials make
decisions that are based on understanding of environmental conse-
quences, and take actions that protect, restore and enhance the envi-
ronment."
253
Second, NEPA requires that alternatives to proposed action be
considered, while ESA does not. As seen in Catron County, a criti-
cal habitat designation can significantly threaten people's safety and
damage their property.2 4 Thus, while the consequences of a des-
ignation may constitute significant effects on the human environ-
ment, the impact and alternatives to such proposed activity were not
adequately addressed by ESA.255 In such cases "[p]otential alter-
natives to a proposed federal action" would be unknown until the
acting federal agency "complie[d] with NEPA and prepare[d] at
least an EA., 256 Moreover, the designation of an area as critical
habitat effectively prohibits the federal government from engaging
in any activity in that area likely to harm an endangered or threat-
ened species."7 Thus, ESA's narrower analysis of species extinc-
tion, does not comply to the fullest extent possible with NEPA's
broader purpose.
Third, a reexamination of the "congressional waiver" argument
counters the Ninth Circuit's rationale. The core of the congressional
waiver argument is that congressional failure to modify previous
251. 42 U.S.C. § 4332.
252. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).
253. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.1(c) (1995).
254. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1437-38.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 171-172.
256. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1437.
257. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994).
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administrative and judicial decisions involving NEPA noncompli-
ance is evidence that Congress endorsed such noncompliance.258
The Ninth Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's statement that
congressional failure to revise a statute that has been interpreted by
an administrative agency is persuasive evidence that Congress in-
tended the statute to be interpreted this way. 9 While this is true,
the Ninth Circuit failed to note the Supreme Court's further state-
ment that "failure to revise, unaccompanied by any evidence of
congressional awareness of the interpretation, is not persuasive evi-
dence."2" Stated another way, "[slomething more than [congres-
sional] passivity is required." '261 The Secretary provided no evi-
dence that Congress contemplated or was even aware of the Sixth
Circuit's ruling in Pacific Legal Foundation,262 or of the EPA's
published policy.263 In addition, there is no mention of either of
these interpretations in the legislative history of the 1988 ESA
amendments.2"
Moreover, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's statements, the "con-
gressional waiver" theory only applies in cases where Congress
revisits the actual "language subject to the administrative interpreta-
tion. '  The Secretary conceded in Catron County that although
258. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438 (citing Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986)).
259. See supra part IV.B.3.
260. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438 (citing Girouard v. United States, 328
U.S. 61, 69 (1946)) ("It is at best treacherous to find in congressional silence
alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law."); see also Brown v. Gardner, 115
S. Ct. 552, 557 (1994) (finding congressional silence lacks persuasive signifi-
cance).
261. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438 (citing Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 846 (1986)). It is the proponent of congressio-
nal acquiescence who bears the "burden of showing 'abundant evidence that Con-
gress both contemplated and authorized' the previous non-congressional interpre-
tation." Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 847 (1986)).
262. 657 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1981).
263. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438; Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp.
1470, 1484-85 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd sub nom., Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48
F.3d 1495 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.Ct. 698 (1996).
264. See H.R. REP. No. 467, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 111-32 (1988), reprinted
in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700, 2700-50.
265. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438-39 (citing Central Bank of Denver v.
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Congress did amend parts of ESA, which govern the designation of
critical habitat, it did not specifically consider the critical habitat
provisions of ESA."6 The ESA amendments and corresponding
legislative history further substantiate that critical habitat designa-
tions were not addressed by Congress during the amendment pro-
cess.267 During the 1978 amendments to ESA, Senator McClure
proposed defining critical habitat designations as "major federal ac-
tion[s] for purposes of NEPA. ' '261 Senator McClure withdrew the
amendment, but only after asking that the record not reflect "that,
in the absence of the amendment [requiring an impact statement],
there is no possibility that an EIS is required."'26 9 Accordingly, the
legislative history of ESA does provide some evidence that "Con-
gress ... intended secretarial compliance with NEPA when desig-
nating habitat under ESA.'2 7' Thus, the Tenth circuit was correct
when it stated that "congressional silence in this case [is] unpersua-
sive"2  and that the legislative history "indicates that Congress
intended that the Secretary comply with NEPA when designating
critical habitat under ESA .... 2'2
The Ninth Circuit's argument that NEPA does not mandate an
EIS for proposed activity that preserves the physical environment is
not compelling. The inherent weakness in this argument is that an
EIS is required to determine the impact of any action, even if ap-
First Interstate Bank of Denver, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1453 (1994)).
266. Id.
267. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 467, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 111-22 (1988),
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2700, 2700-50).
268. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1439 (citing 124 CONG. REc. S11,143-145
(daily ed. July 19, 1978) (statements of Sens. Wallop and McClure)). Senator
Wallop opposed this amendment because he thought that an EIS would be re-
quired for designations that were not major federal actions. Id.
269. Id. (quoting 124 CONG. REc. S 11,143-145 (daily ed. July 19, 1978) (state-
ment of Sen. Wallop)).
270. Id. It is important to note that interpretive analysis of legislative history
must be conducted cautiously. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring). With this in mind, it is intriguing that Congress intended
that the Secretary prepare an EIS when designating critical habitat, only in some
cases. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1439.
271. Catron County, 75 F.3d at 1438.
272. Id. at 1439.
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parently beneficial, to determine whether the human environment
will be adversely affected.
NEPA's requirements are not functionally equivalent to ESA's
requirements concerning designation of critical habitat. Under
NEPA, an EIS examines the affect that an activity has on the hu-
man environment. 3 In contrast, ESA's primary directive is the
preservation of species. 4 NEPA's directives expand the impact
study, requiring that alternatives to proposed actions also be consid-
ered.275 In light of NEPA's added considerations before allowing
federal activity, NEPA is not functionally equivalent to ESA.
Filing an EIS does not frustrate ESA's operation. It is reasonable
to interpret the ESA phrase "any other relevant impact" as permit-
ting a "wide range of impacts ... to be analyzed." '76 Nonetheless,
the Ninth Circuit embraces a much narrower reading of ESA, con-
cluding that "the Secretary cannot engage in the very broad analysis
NEPA requires when designating a critical habitat under the
ESA. 7 The Ninth Circuit, however, justified this narrow interpre-
tation only by following the Sixth Circuit's reasoning that "relevant
impact" was to be read within the bounds of ESA factors which are
limited to impacts on species. The plain meaning of the words,
"any other relevant impact, ' gives the Secretary the discretion
to consider alternative impacts on the environment, including im-
pacts on the human environment. The language of ESA thus sug-
gests that the Secretary take into account factors similar to the con-
siderations covered in an EIS and the filing of an EIS therefore
does not frustrate ESA's operation.
The decision to list a species as endangered or threatened does
not further the purpose of NEPA regardless of an EIS require-
ment."' The Ninth Circuit correctly states that designating critical
habitat protects the environment from the human impact that NEPA
273. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). One primary purpose of NEPA is to "promote
efforts which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere
and stimulate the health and welfare of man." Id. (emphasis added).
274. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994).
275. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(iii) (1988).
276. Douglas County v. Lujan, 810 F. Supp. 1470, 1479 (D. Or. 1992).
277. Douglas County v. Babbitt, 48 F.3d 1495, 1507 (9th Cir. 1995).
278. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
279. Pacific Legal Found. v. Andrus, 657 F.2d 829, 837 (6th Cir. 1981).
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seeks to prevent."' However, ESA only prohibits and prevents
human impacts on the environment. 8' In contrast, NEPA consid-
ers any proposed activity's effects on the human environment.
Without preparing an EIS, the critical habitat designation's impact
on man will remain uncertain because ESA does not necessarily
consider such human concerns. 2 Thus, ESA does not further
NEPA's goals, contrary to the suggestion of the Ninth Circuit.
CONCLUSION
There are only two exceptions to NEPA requirements. The ESA
mandate does not directly conflict with NEPA, nor are the two acts
functionally equivalent. In addition, NEPA furthers the goals of
ESA since it is impossible to make a fully informed decision with-
out preparing an EIS as required under NEPA. On the contrary, not
requiring the filing of an EIS would limit NEPA's primary purpose
of ensuring that officials act to protect, restore, and enhance the
environment, in light of heightened environmental awareness.
Therefore, the Secretary must comply with NEPA when designating
critical habitat pursuant to ESA.
280. Douglas County, 48 F.3d at 1507.
281. Catron County Bd. of Comm'rs v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 75
F.3d 1429, 1437 (10th Cir. 1996).
282. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2) (1994).
